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Abstract
Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose is a serio-comic pastiche of the detective story set in the middle
ages, which uses history as "a distant mirror" to comment, from a Western Marxist perspective, on
contemporary political issues. Structurally, however, The Name of the Rose is a fictional enactment of
many of the semiotician's recent critical and philosophical ideas. ( 1) Eco's discussion of "abductive"
reasoning in C. S. Peirce and Aristotle appears in a detective not only more fallible than Sherlock Holmes
but more aware of what his powers consist of and why they work and fail. (2) Eco's explanation of what
he calls the "iterative scheme" in popular fiction—ways of handling time that allow for indefinite
sequelae—appears negatively here, where time and time's passage are given their full durational weight.
(3) Eco's discussion of closed and open texts, and of a third category "of which the chairman is probably
Tristram Shandy," which evades both modes of reading and forces one into consciousness of the reading
process itself, is enacted in The Name of the Rose, in a traditionally closed genre (the mystery) which is
first opened but finally given an ending that deconstructs the mystery novel by forcing the reader into the
third, Shandean, mode.
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ECO'S ECHOES:
SEMIOTIC THEORY AND
DETECTIVE PRACTICE IN
THE NAME OF THE ROSE
DAVID H. RICHTER
Queens College, City University of New York
Structure I. Eco and the Semiotics of Detection
omnis mundi creatura
quasi liber et pictura
nobis est in speculum

Alain de Lille (1130-1202): "Anticlaudianus"'
The Name ofthe Rose can be said, in effect, to trace the stages in
long line between Alain de Lille, the twelfth-century
antischolastic, and modern structuralists like Umberto Eco himself.
Separated by eight centuries, Alain and Eco would agree that the
world is like a vast text, "quasi liber et pictura," and that our task on
earth is learning the rules for reading it.
The Name of the Rose has been treated as an unusually clever
pastiche of the Sherlock Holmes novels. This is a misreading, but one
that Eco has courted. He has, after all, named his protagonist William
of Baskerville, made him a native of Ireland (like Doyle's ancestors),
given him the height, the sharpness of eye and beakiness of nose
associated with the sleuth of Baker Street. The narrator's name,
Adso, is the middle four phonemes of "Watson" (as close as one
could come in a Latinized name), and though a cloistered monk, Adso
shares Watson's unascetic gusto for the pleasures of the table and his
predilection for romance, along with a talent for muddling up the
clues.
The structure of Eco's novel, however, owes very little to Doyle,
whose longer detective fictions usually tended to split into two
novelettes: one a tale of crime and detection, the other a sensational
the
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melodrama about Mormons or East Indian convicts or labor
racketeering in the industrial Midwest. (Only The Hound of the
Baskervilles, to which William's name obviously alludes, has the
unity of plot and tone Eco has achieved here). In its plotting The
Name ofthe Rose seems to owe less to Doyle than to Dorothy Sayers,
John Dickson Carr and Ellery Queen. Despite the medieval setting,
Eco has collected the complete paraphernalia of a classic mystery of
the 1930s: maps, cryptograms, unbreakable alibis, a locked room, a
labyrinthine library, clues in a variety of foreign languages, all
surrounding a series of grisly murders, carefully spaced one per day,
with an elaborate textual patterning to them. It was apparently Eco's
intention to write the mystery to end all mysteries.
But there is another sense in which The Name of the Rose is a
mystery to end all mysteries: it is also a critique and a parody of the
form. This is true in obvious ways-merely setting a murder mystery
in the late middle ages suggests either more or less than entirely
serious intentions. Part of the book's pleasure comes from watching
the conventions of the form crop up, regular as fate, in the most
unexpected settings. As a result, the reader seems to be reading two
novels at once: a classic detective story, and a detective story in
quotation marks-the latter a post-modern fiction which calls attention to its very fictionality.
Perhaps Eco is merely spoofing the mystery form. But the parody
has its serious side where it connects with Eco's professional interest
in detection as a semiotic activity. It is only in a superficial sense that
The Name of the Rose presents a Holmes-figure in characteristic action: for William of Baskerville is far more self-conscious and selfcritical than Doyle's self-aggrandizing detective who, in A Study in
Scarlet (his debut novel), writes a magazine article boasting of his
infallibility.' As a philosopher, Eco is more aware than Doyle was of
the logical status of detective ingenuity.
Throughout the Holmes stories, the detective's abilities are
explained as "the science of deduction." One locus classicus
explaining the Holmesian method occurs in The Sign of Four:

"But you spoke just now of observation and deduction.
Surely the one to some extent implies the other."
"Why, hardly," [Holmes] answered.
"For example,
observation shows me that you have been to the Wigmore Street
.
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Post-Office this morning, but deduction lets me know that when
there you dispatched a telegram."
"Right!" said I. "Right on both points! But I confess that I
don't see how you arrived at it ."
"It is simplicity itself," he remarked, chuckling at my
surprise -"so absurdly simple that an explanation is
superfluous; and yet it may serve to define the limits of observation and of deduction. Observation tells me that you have a little
reddish mould adhering to your instep. Just opposite the
Wigmore Street Office they have taken up the pavement and
thrown up some earth, which lies in such a way that it is difficult
to avoid treading in it in entering. The earth is of this peculiar
reddish tint which is found, as far as I know, nowhere else in the
neighbourhood. So much is observation. The rest is deduction."
"How, then, did you deduce the telegram?"
"Why, of course I knew that you had not written a letter,
since I sat opposite to you all morning. I see also in your open
desk there that you have a sheet of stamps and a thick bundle of
postcards. What could you go into the post-office for, then, but to
send a wire? Eliminate all other factors, and the one which
remains must be the truth." (pp. 138-39)
.

.

Holmes-and Doyle-probably thought that this was a perfect
demonstration of deductive logic, but when one examines it a bit, it is
rather less than impeccable. The syllogism upon which Holmes's
inference relies would run, according to his explanation, as follows:
Men who enter the Post Office will invariably get red
mould on their boots.
Watson has red mould on his boots.
Therefore Watson has entered the Post Office.
But this syllogism is invalid: the middle term is undistributed. A
syllogism in barbara could be constructed if the major term were
given as "All those and only those who enter the post office have red
mould on their boots." But this is not what Holmes actually asserts,
and detectives in general do not make their assertions in such a form.
One might step in red earth walking past the post-office; one might
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step into it and clean one's boots afterwards. Similarly with Holmes's
"deduction" of the telegram: if there were three and only three reasons
for entering a post office (sending a letter, buying postage, dispatching
a telegram), then eliminating the first two possibilities would demonstrate the third. But is it possible to catalog and eliminate all the
possible reasons for entering a post office? The point is not that
Holmes is a charlatan, or that Doyle was, but that logical deduction,
of the sort whose regulations are presented in Aristotle's Posterior
Analytics, has very little to do with what Holmes is doing. It is
noteworthy that the philosopher who best described the art Holmes
practiced-the art upon which scientists, doctors, and real detectives
all depend-was a contemporary of Doyle's, the American Charles
Sanders Peirce.' To the previously established logical methods of
deduction and induction, Peirce added a third, which he gave the
perhaps unfortunate name of "abduction." Whereas deduction
proceeds from a general rule (or a definition) to a particular case, and
whereas induction proceeds from a series of facts to a general rule,
"abduction" is "the provisional entertainment of an explanatory
inference, for the sake of further testing."4 In abduction-a mode of
reasoning we all probably use far more often than strict syllogistic
deduction-both the general rule and the particular conclusion are
held only tentatively; they are conjectures to be confirmed or refuted,
not certain truths.
One does not need to read Eco's philosophical essay on abduction to understand its relevance to detective fiction. Much of it is
explicitly presented in The Name of the Rose:

"Adso," William said, "solving a mystery is not the same as
deducing from first principles. Nor does it amount simply to
collecting a number of particular data from which to infer a
general law. It means, rather, facing one or two or three particular
data apparently with nothing in common, and trying to imagine
whether they could represent so many instances of a general law
you don't yet know, and which perhaps has never been
pronounced.
Take the case of animals with horns. Why do
they have horns? Suddenly you realize that all animals with
horns are without [incisors] in the upper jaw. This would be a fine
discovery, if you did not also realize that, alas, there are animals
without [incisors] in the upper jaw who, however, do not have
horns: the camel, to name one. And finally you realize that all
.

.

.
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animals without [incisors] in the upper jaw have four stomachs.
Well, then, you can suppose that one who cannot chew well must
need four stomachs to digest food better. But what about the
horns? You then try to imagine a material cause for horns-say,
the lack of teeth provides the animal with an excess of osseous
matter that must emerge somewhere else. But is that sufficient
but
explanation? No, because the camel has no upper teeth
does not have horns. And you must also imagine a final cause.
The osseous matter emerges in horns only in animals without
other means of defense. But the camel has a very tough hide and
The search for explicative laws in natural
doesn't need horns.
facts proceeds in a tortuous fashion. In the face of some
inexplicable facts you must try to imagine many general laws,
whose connection with the facts escapes you. Then suddenly, in
the unexpected connection of a result, a specific situation, and
one of those laws, you perceive a line of reasoning that seems
to use it
more convincing than the others. You try applying it
for making predictions, and you discover that your intuition was
right. But until you reach the end you will never know which
predicates to introduce into your reasoning and which to
omit.
."5
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

William's theory here is one of the major "problematic
anachronisms" that I shall discuss in the next section of this essay. As
a theory, it owes a great deal to Peirce, and nearly as much to Sir Karl
Popper's explanation of the scientific method as a series of conjectures and refutations in The Logic ofScientific Discovery (1952). But
the example William gives is straight out ofAristotle's On the Parts of
Animals, a text Eco also analyzes at length in "Horns, Hooves,
Insteps," showing that 2300 years ago "the master of those that
know" intuitively understood the essential tool of scientific method
which Eco calls "creative abduction" ("Horns," p. 215).
In The Sign of Four Holmes is permitted suavely to assure
Watson, "I never guess. It is a shocking habit-destructive to the
logical faculty" (p. 138). But in The Name of the Rose Eco's detective, the superficially Holmesian William of Baskerville, is well aware
that in the exercise of his logical faculty he needs to guess constantly,
and that the world-made up as it is of "everything that is the case"
will confirm or deny his hypotheses, make him seem a genius or a fool.

-
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It is significant that the opening demonstration of William's
detective abilities-his description and location of the abbot's horse
Brunellus (pp. 23-25)-though a convention of the detective novel
since Doyle, does not directly allude to the Sherlock Holmes canon.
Instead of using a displaced version of one of Holmes's feats, Eco
began The Name of the Rose with a revision of part of chapter 3 of
Zadig. There the Chaldean hero of Voltaire's conte philosophique
dazzles the servants of the King of Babylon by telling them that the
horse they are looking for, and which Zadig himself has never laid
eyes on, "is the fleetest horse in the King's stable.
He is five feet
high, with very small hoofs, and a tall three and a half feet in length; the
studs on his bit are gold of twenty-three carats, and his shoes are silver
of eleven pennyweights.'''
My first notion was that, in this detective-story-to-end-all-detective-stories, Eco thought it clever to begin with a proto-detective fiction written a century before Poe's pioneering tales. But after looking
at "Horns, Hooves, Insteps," it becomes clear that Eco had
something else in mind as well-what he calls "meta-abduction," the
problem of testing for correspondence the world of one's mental
constructs against the world outside one's head. The reason Zadig is
only one of the forerunners of the detective story and not its first
exemplar is that Zadig himself refuses to take that step. When the
huntsmen ask where the horse is, Zadig refuses to guess as Holmes
and never heard
would do, but instead replies "I have not seen him
talk of him before" (p. 11). And, Zadig is first condemned for stealing
the horse and then, when the horse is found, for lying to the huntsmen
about not having seen the beast whose characteristics he had actually
abduced. Eco's meditation on Zadig is that, while the philosopher is
willing to speak about his abductions as mental constructs of his own,
he resists being trapped into asserting an identity between the possible
horse of his inferences and the actual horse the huntsmen are seeking:
"Unable to accept his fate as a Sherlock Holmes, Zadig was
frightened by meta-abduction" ("Horns," p. 215).
Holmes, of course, is never frightened. Though as Eco points
out, he often guesses with far less reason for certainty than Zadig had,
he never guesses wrong. This is because "he has the privilege of living
in a world built by Conan Doyle to fit his egocentric need, so he
does not lack immediate proofs of his perspicacity" ("Horns,"
p. 218).
.

.
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There is always faithful Watson, ever ready to admit to having acted
or thought as Holmes guesses; nor is the outside world of crime ever so
unkind as to falsify Holmes's abductions. Eco goes on to suggest that,
"Whereas in criminal stories an omnipotent God verifies the
hypotheses forever, in 'real' scientific inquiries (as well as in real
criminal, medical, or philological deduction) meta-abductions are a
frightening matter. Zadig is not a detection story but a philosophical
tale because its deep subject is exactly the vertigo of meta-abduction" ("Horns," p. 219).
As we shall see more clearly in the last section of this essay, The
Name of the Rose stands midway between the detective story and the
philosophic tale. More like a Sherlock Holmes than a Zadig, William
of Baskerville defies the "vertigo" and volunteers his guess about
what Brunellus looks like and where he has gone. And as though he
were in a literary world protected by Doyle, the guess is right on
target. But unlike the detectives who attribute their infallibility to logic
rather than authorial kindness, William knows that his was merely a
lucky guess:

In the case of the horse Brunellus, when I saw the clues I guessed
many complementary and contradictory hypotheses.
I didn't
know which hypothesis was right until I saw the cellarer and the
servants anxiously searching. Then I understood that the
Brunellus hypothesis was the only right one, and I tried to prove it
true, addressing the monks as I did. I won, but I might also have
lost. The others believed me wise because I won, but they didn't
know the many instances in which I have been foolish because I
lost, and they didn't know that a few seconds before winning I
wasn't sure I wouldn't lose. (Name, p. 305)
.

.

.

While the Holmesian whodunit proceeds on the Cartesian
assumption that there is an order to the universe that can be mirrored
in the constructs of an orderly mind, Eco's mystery takes a more
modern, post-Kantian tack. William never doubts that mental
constructs may possess clarity and order: but there is always a leap of
faith to the decision that the outside world does. And Eco, as we shall
see, is less kind to William than Doyle is to Sherlock Holmes. In this
sense The Name of the Rose is based upon a semiotic theory that is
essentially subversive of the mystery genre. And in setting such a
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semiotic quest within the middle ages, Eco's novel is structurally
underpinned by a global anachronism, within which local instances of
intellectual time-warp are set as textural motifs.

Texture I. Problematic Anachronisms
In The Name ofthe Rose we are not allowed unselfconsciously to
lose ourselves in a historical novel. We are again and again made

aware by the work's inherent contradictions-or apparent
anachronisms-that we are reading one. In a sense, there was no way
Eco could have preserved "suspension of disbelief." The reader is
bound to be brought up short from time to time by the inescapable
anachronism of the novel-a whodunit set in the middle ages. The
strategy taken up by many contemporary historical novelists (e.g.,
Mary Renault or Robert Graves), of attempting as far as possible to
convey the life of the narrative past in language and narrative
technique roughly appropriate to that period, is foreclosed for Eco. To
be a detective at all, his protagonist, William of Baskerville, must be
essentially a modern man, but he must also be placed within a
medieval setting that is as authentic as possible. There is an inherent
self-contradiction in this, but instead of trying to deceive the reader
about this, Eco chose a playful way of writing historical fiction that
would keep the reader off balance; it would fall somewhere between
pastiche and serious narrative.
One way of playing with the reader is the phony anachronism.
The game to which Eco invites us involves matching wits with the
author, and so is structurally similar to the game in the detective story
proper except that it can be played again and again. The pattern runs
in this way: the author allows the "thoroughly modern" William of
Baskerville to use a phrase that recalls a quotation from a later date, or
to mention some fact or some process we associate with a more
modern period. Then the reader recalls-or looks up-the actual
historical situation, and the apparent anachronism is eliminated.
but
Take, for example, William's statement: "We are dwarfs
dwarfs who stand on the shoulder of those giants, and small though we
are, we sometimes manage to see farther on the horizon than
.
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they" (p. 86). This is an all-too-familiar quotation. The classic
formulation is: "dwarves that stand on the shoulders of giants can see
farther than the giants themselves," usually ascribed to Isaac Newton
in the late seventeenth century. Eco is probably familiar, though, with
the work of the sociologist of knowledge Robert K. Merton, who wrote
a very entertaining little book called On the Shoulders of Giants. It
traces the quotation back considerably before 1327-to the twelfthcentury philosopher Bernard of Chartres-and Eco even includes the
detail that his William of Baskerville had studied at Chartres.
A more convoluted instance involves Adso's heartfelt remark on
Jacques of Cahors, later Pope John XXII: "and heaven grant that no
pontiff take again a name so distasteful to the righteous" (p. 12). The
first level of the joke is fairly obvious: it is well-known that Angelo
Giuseppe Roncalli, on ascending the throne of St. Peter, took the title
of John XXIII as a way of disinfecting a name that had remained
unused since the middle ages. The second level of the joke is rather
more obscure: the bad smell in the name of John had been left at least
as much by a previous John XXIII (Baldassare Cossa, 1410-15) as
by the John XXII who appears in The Name of the Rose. The
fifteenth-century pope (he was one of two anti-popes-the other was
Benedict XIII-who had been elected by a faction during the official
pontificate of Gregory XII) was accused of so many crimes, including
heresy, simony, piracy, sodomy, rape, incest and the assassination of
his predecessor, that he was deposed by the Council of Constance as
scandalk or ecclesiae.
Not all the anachronisms turn into jokes on the half-learned
reader. Some of them remain anachronisms. Most of these are
intertextual jokes, like the hints (p. 16) that William gets high chewing
the leaves of some mysterious forest herbs (whose effects-lethargy
and visions-sound suspiciously like those of cannabis). Here, of
course, the point is an allusion to Sherlock Holmes's dalliance, at
times of intellectual vacuity, with the cocaine-bottle. Substituting
cannabis for coca is at least mildly anachronistic, since around 1327
Indian Hemp was used as a drug only in the Orient and was
apparently unknown in the West till the 1580s. We could make the
favorable assumption that William is familiar with Eastern sources
now forgotten, but cocaine itself would have been utterly impossible,
as the coca plant is native to the Americas and would be unavailable in
Europe for nearly two hundred years.
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Some of the anachronistic jokes, though, are not intertextual in
any very specific sense: they pertain rather to the general tradition of
learned wit to which this novel belongs. At one point William recites a
famina, apparently
few gnomic lines from a text called Hisperica
a medieval poem about the Irish Potato Famine of the 1840s (p. 311).
At still another point William makes what we cannot fail to interpret
as a mocking allusion to Freud ("We have so many truths in our
possession that if the day came when someone insisted on deriving a
truth even from our dreams, then the day of the Antichrist would truly
be at hand" (p. 438). And on what is nearly the novel's last page
(p. 492), William quotes for Adso "a mystic from your land"
(Germany), who wrote "somewhere, I forget where" about
philosophical constructs: " 'Er muoz gel ichsame die leiter abwerfen,
so er an it ufgestigen' " (p. 438). It means "One must throw down the
ladder as soon as he has climbed up it," and it was written-though
not in Middle High German, of course-by Ludwig Wittgenstein in
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921).'
The novel is filled with this sort of amusement-a sort of PhDlevel Trivial Pursuit. Out of hundreds possible let me give one last
example, which is not a joke but rather an homage to the greatest
master of the learned wit tradition, Francois Rabelais. The
"maguffin" of The Name of the Rose, the manuscript containing
Aristotle's lost treatise on comedy, is bound together with several
other manuscripts in various languages; one of these is "Expositio
Magistri Alcofribae de coena beati Cypriani Cartaginensis Episcopi"
(p. 439)-a commentary on the porno-satiric Coena Cypriani by one
"Master Alcofribas." "Alcofribas Nasier," of course, was the
anagrammatical pseudonym under which Rabelais began in 1532 to
publish his porno-satirical histories of Gargantua and Pantagruel.
There are a number of connections here: like William of Baskerville,
Rabelais was a Franciscan friar who transferred for political reasons
to the Benedictines. Adso and William's pleasure in lists-lists that
go on long after you expected them to be exhausted-comes directly
from Rabelais. But the central issue, I suspect, is the "carnivalization" (as Mikhail Bakhtin puts it) of history and scholarship Rabelais
brings to fiction. This carnivalization is precisely what Eco is
attempting in The Name of the Rose: not a parody of the detective
story, precisely, nor a pastiche, but a witty and learned game which
not only solicits but demands the participation of the reader, and deals
out rewards in proportion to his own learning and wit.
.
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Texture II. Time in The Name of the Rose: The Black Death

In The Role of the Reader, Eco has analyzed the way Time is
structured in series detective stories, like those involving Sherlock
Holmes or Nero Wolfe: he calls this "the iterative scheme. "8 In each
novel or story, the "event takes up again from a sort of virtual
beginning, ignoring where the preceding event left off" (Role, p. 119).
A series, like the Nero Wolfe stories of Rex Stout, contains a vast
number of topoi, which are repeated again and again. On the one hand
there are "infinite variations of the theme" in that each new crime
"has new psychological and economic motivations" (Role, p. 119);
on the other hand, the memorable moments are the ones that recur
from book to book (e.g., Wolfe getting up to tend his orchids when the
case is at an obvious crisis point). The point is that as a series, it
ignores the way time is consumed by the events of the story: for over
forty years-from the early 1930s when the series began to the late
1970s when it ended-Wolfe always seems to be a man in his forties,
Archie Goodwin in his late twenties. Rare cases may fall into an
ordered series, and occasionally a novel will refer to one of its
predecessors or to a topical event, but generally each novel
constitutes a new beginning that is connected only vaguely to
historical time or to the continuous pasts of the series characters.
Historical detective stories like The Name of the Rose must be
set at some definite time (i.e., they cannot be set in a vague narrative
present like the Nero Wolfe series, but there is no reason that Eco's
"iterative scheme" may not apply to them. Indeed, the "Sergeant
Cribb" series of Peter Lovesey is a sequence of Victorian romans
policiers with eminently predictable topoi. Most historical
whodunits, even when they happen to be singletons (like John
Dickson Can's The Demoniacs), fail to consume the lives of the
narrator and/or the detective; unlike most novels, they might be
continued indefinitely, in that nothing unalterable occurs to characters other than the disposable victims and villains.
In The Name of the Rose, however, Eco reverses this narrative
convention of the detective story. Though the story takes up only a
week or so in the lives of William and Adso, the novel is set within a
restrictive time-frame that "consumes" the characters and prevents
any sense of possible continuation. Most important for this aspect of

Published by New Prairie Press

11

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5

224

STCL, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1986)

the story is the framed beginning and ending of the story, in which
Adso the narrator, old and perhaps dying toward the end of the
fourteenth century, places in context the events of the novel, which are
set within his youth in the year 1327. The effect is not solely a matter
of age and youth: between Adso the writer and Adso the character
there looms the great event of the fourteenth century, the Black Death
of 1348-50. Before the Black Death were the high middle ages, the
renaissance of learning of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; after it
came a century of chaos as Europe recovered from the death of over
one third of its population. William, Adso tells us, perished during the
plague-which perhaps we are to see as a less than tragically premature end for a man who is well into his fifties in 1327. The point,
though, is that Adso, who survived, tells us of a society which largely
did not: he tells us of "the disaster of an aging world" (p. 15).
In terms of the "distant mirror" aspect of The Name ofthe Rose,
the intertextual play between the fourteenth and twentieth centuries,
the Black Death is an equivalent of atomic holocaust-a close
equivalent, if one adds the proviso that the latter is less likely to leave
monastic chroniclers like Adso to record it. What is probably most
important about it, for Eco's purposes, is that in Adso's retrospective
narrative (and the reader's historical perspective) the echo of the
Black Death invests the action with the sense of impending chaos, of
an apparently ordered and balanced intellectual and social system
whose doom is already pronounced.

Texture III. The "Distant Mirror" Theme
Barbara Tuchman's popular history of the fourteenth century
was entitled A Distant Mirror and she was by no means the first
historian to see "phenomenal parallels" between that age and our
own. When this century was only two decades old, James Westfall
Thompson was ready to compare the aftermath of World War I with
that of the Black Death. Thompson saw both the fourteenth and the
twentieth centuries as exceptionally disordered: in both he found
running rampant "economic chaos, social unrest, high prices,
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol10/iss2/5
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profiteering, depraved morals, lack of production, industrial
indolence, frenetic gaiety, wild expenditure, luxury, debauchery,
social and religious hysteria, greed, avarice, maladministration,
decay of manners." 9 The advent over the past forty years of weaponry
capable of depopulating the world faster and more dependably than
the bubonic plague has only deepened the sense that we have
something to learn from that unhappy period.
Just as the tone of The Name ofthe Rose owes a good deal to the
overhanging shadow of the Black Death, Eco's secondary purpose in
setting his detective entertainment in the early fourteenth century may
have had more to do with the pestilential politics of Emperor and Pope
than with the apocalypse of rats and lice that came later. The
suggestive analogy, I think, for a liberal European socialist like Eco, is
the cold war between Louis the Bavarian and John XXII on the one
hand, and that today on the other between capitalism and
communism, America and the Soviet Union, NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. In both cases, I think Eco deplores the insistent division of the
political and moral powers of the known world, a division that
implicitly brooks neither independence nor neutrality, which claims
that all who are not for me are against me. I would argue that Eco has
drawn such an analogy, and has developed it at a length thatdetracting formally from The Name of the Rose as it does-indicates
the strength of his personal commitment to it."
The general structure of the political allegory, which is not
explored with absolute consistency, would equate the party of Holy
Roman Emperor Louis of Bavaria with the massive might of the
USSR, with the ideology of socialism, perhaps with the alliance of
Warsaw Pact and socialist movements in Europe and the Third
World; conversely, the party of Pope John XXII might be identified
with the USA, with the ideology of capitalism, with the NATO
alliance. This alignment would put the Franciscans-who were in
doctrinal opposition to the Pope, though ostensibly his own order-in
the approximate position of the European socialist movements.
Perhaps I have this backwards. Since the Emperor had the habit of
using, then abandoning his allies and since the Pope was the more
obviously ruthless of the two men, it may be that we are to link Louis
with the Western and John with the Eastern bloc. In fact the orientation of the allegory makes very little difference. What is important for
Eco is the absolute nature of the confrontation, the way the political
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battle raged over Europe for decades with final victory ever elusive,
and the fact that the outcome of the battle, for both sides, was the
destruction of the authority of the institutions they represented.
For an Italian socialist like Eco, in fact, the central problems of
the international scene have to do less with the USA and the USSR,
with their half billion inhabitants, than with the impact of their struggle
on the three billion people elsewhere in nations that might prefer to be
unaligned but who are inexorably forced to take sides, if only to give
them standing to help mediate the conflict. While there are no certain
limits to the application of Eco's political allegory in The Name ofthe
Rose, I think there are at least three major issues that haunt him: (1)
the nominally "socialist" revolutionary movements in the Third
World, (2) the attraction of intellectuals to terrorism, and (3) the
international penetration of other nations by clandestine political
organizations like CIA and KGB. Let me briefly indicate the connections between Eco's fiction and these three problems.
1. The fourteenth century was a fertile period for heresies of
various sorts: Fraticelli, Catharists, Waldensians, Arnoldists,
Patarines, and countless other groups sprang up and were ruthlessly
extirpated by the Papacy. Around pp. 196-207, William holds a
platonic dialogue with Adso on what he calls "the great river of
heresy." William rejects the idea that most heretics are convinced
adherents of particular mistaken doctrines. In fact, he points out, most
heretics are simple folk who might join the Catharists in one village
and the Waldensians in another-though the two heresies are
doctrinally quite distinct. In the Church's view a heretical doctrine is
first proclaimed by a renegade cleric and then taken up by the simple.
In William's view it is the condition of being "simple" rather than the
doctrine that causes heresy, for the simple-those landless peasants
without a stake in the State, who were equally excluded from the
intellectual and social protection of the Church-join heretical
movements not because they believe but because the movements give
them hope: the hope at least of violently overthrowing the order that
excludes them.
The parallel is obvious between William's "simple" heretics and
the peasantry today who join, and willingly fight and die for socialist
or communist movements in the Third World. Their doctrinal
commitment to Marxism is scant at best: they believe in whatever
opposes the native or colonial powers that be, whatever gives them
hope to overturn the order that keeps them hungry. Eco seems to be
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol10/iss2/5
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suggesting that the West, and the USA in particular, is paranoid about
such "communist" movements; it misunderstands them as an overt
threat to join the Soviet enemy, when the cause is not an affection for
the ideas of Marx but the hunger of the people-a hunger for inclusion within the international polity no less than for bread.
2. One rather memorable character Eco took from the pages of
history and transferred to The Name of the Rose is Fra Ubertino of
Casale, author of the Arbor Vitae Crucifixae. Ubertino was one of the
Spirituales, a rather mystical religious movement deriving from the
prophecies of the twelfth-century apocalyptic thinker Joachim da
Floris. Ubertino's personal history and that of his movement appear
in The Name ofthe Rose at pp. 41-64; for most of the rest of the novel,
Ubertino is relatively undeveloped as a character, neither a suspect
nor a victim. The point of his introduction, in a way, can be fully
understood only after the passages on heresy, for Ubertino is an
intellectual whose preaching led the "simple" to join heretical
movements (like the Dolcinians and the Fraticelli), movements that
the Papacy crushed with fire and the sword. But Ubertino somehow
managed to keep himself clear of the taint of heresy, speaks with
horror of the Fraticelli, and evidently believes that there is some
quintessential difference between the beliefs of Fra Dolcino, who
suffered at the stake, and his own-but what that difference is the
reader will be at a loss to determine.
I can make sense of this episode as a displaced commentary on a
group of European leftists who glorify revolution but who have little
stomach for the violence of terrorists that would put their programs
into practice. These "limousine liberals," like Ubertino, have no
intention of losing their privileged places in the societies they attack,
much less of suffering for their beliefs. Eco may have in mind the
crowds that idolized Herbert Marcuse or Frantz F anon in the sixties;
perhaps Ubertino is a satire on the grand-daddy of them all: Jean-Paul
Sartre. In any case, Eco quietly exposes their hypocritical habit of
theoretically advocating violence while remaining noncommittal
about savage terrorism of the Black September type.
3. Finally there is another character out of history: the Papal
Inquisitor Bernard Gui (1261-1331), author of the Practica Inquisitionis. In a sense, Bernard assumes a place within The Name of the
Rose that the traditional structure of the detective story assigns to the
dumb cop, the unimaginative official policeman who flails about,
baffled by his inability to solve the crime. But Bernard is more than a
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structural locus and a foil for William. It is hard to forget that, unlike
the usual behavior of cops in whodunits, he has three innocent people
executed for crimes they have not committed. One point Eco makes
about Bernard's methods is that, seeking out heresy, he invariably
finds it, as the accused's words and deeds will ineluctably be twisted
against him. The other point is that the Inquisition, in trying to
extirpate heresy by the most arbitrary and limitless methods, ends by
causing more than it cures. The analogue could be simply to the
modern version of the Inquisition, the secret police, which, under
various names in both Eastern and Western bloc nations, provokes
the opposition it aims to still. But given the international slant to Eco's
analogues, Gui and the Inquisition may also stand for the international organizations (like the CIA) specializing in covert activities
whose effect is equally perverse: as with Bernard's methods, failure
(as in Cuba and Nicaragua) breeds contempt, while success (as in
Chile) turns potential friends into renegades. Meanwhile the
institution is an international embarrassment to the nation that wields
it.

One might seek even more topical parallels between the events
and institutions in The Name of the Rose and those in the
contemporary world. But Eco has created neither a mere history
lesson nor a sermon on contemporary international politics, but a
system of mirrors by which the present and the past are allowed to
reflect, distort and parody each other.

Structure II. The Denouement of The Name of the Rose:
Between the Modern and the Post-Modern Detective Story

There is a peculiar tension all through The Name of the Rose
between creation and parody, between the apparently sincere imitation of the topoi of the classic mystery novel and the carnivalization of
its forms. This tension explodes in the denouement. It requires a
backward glance, though, at the standard ending of the detective story
and the way its post-modern revisionists have turned it inside out.
In its standard manifestations the form of the detective story is
almost entirely ritualized: a murder is committed, the detective is
called in to investigate, clues are followed up, stories checked,
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol10/iss2/5
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hypotheses presented and discarded; finally the villain is unmasked
and the crime explained to the subsidiary characters-and to the
reader. Or as Dennis Porter has put it: "In the process of telling one
tale, a classic detective story uncovers another. It purports to narrate
the course of an investigation, but the 'open' story of the investigation
gradually unravels the `hidden' story of the crime. ""
The ultimate desideratum of the final explanation-the
obligatory section of the novel that turns the fragmented clues of the
original crime into the material of narrative-is that it be both
astonishing and predictable at once. In the "golden age" of the detective story between the wars, when its writers belonged to guilds and
wrote up sets of rules governing the form," the chief point of the
regulations was fairness-allowing the reader to match wits with the
author on terms that both parties could understand. In more modern
terms, Roger Caillois tells us that the author of the whodunit
"triumphs by explaining the impossible. He first presents an event as
inadmissible, and then accounts for it easily, elegantly, without
At bottom the
forcing anything or using elaborate contrivances.
unmasking of a criminal is less important than the reduction of the
impossible to the possible, the inexplicable to the explained, the
supernatural to the natural."" When the explanation is over, the
detective hands the criminal over to justice or, not infrequently, allows
the criminal to take his own life.
This pattern is so strongly marked that it was parodied almost as
soon as it was established. Even before the so-called "golden age"
between the wars, E. C. Bentley's Trent's Last Case (1913) had
exhibited a false-bottom ending, in which the detective's explanation
of the death of Sigsbee Manderson turns out to require several major
revisions. In the conventional first ending Trent reveals that what at
first had appeared to be a political gang murder was actually a sordid
domestic crime. But then the tables are turned: after confronting the
young man he had accused, Trent admits error and instead comes to
the conclusion that the death was a suicide, till in the final chapter it is
revealed to have been the result of an accident.
All this, however, makes less difference than it might seem, for
while Trent's Last Case was fatal to the convention (derived from Poe
and Doyle) of the superman-detective, Bentley had less rejected the
conventional ending than he had triplicated it. For each new ending
confirms the essential process of detective hermeneutics, merely
adding a few extra clues which had been previously produced within
.
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the purview of both detective and reader, but which Trent, certainly,
had not taken into account.
Throughout the golden age and after, practitioners of the
whodunit worked out variation upon variation on the static topos of
the deductive denouement. Where the case is genuinely altered is in
the postmodern versions ofthe detective story-what I have called the
antimystery. In the major avatars of this subgenre-including works
like Alain Robbe-Grillet's The Erasers, Friedrich DUrrenmates The
Pledge and Jorge Luis Borges's "Death and the Compass"-the
expected conclusion is wrenched around, not merely to a surprising
twist, but to a deconstruction of the form.
Borges and Robbe-Grillet use opposing gambits. In "Death and
the Compass," the detective carries out the deductions in the purest
Holmesian fashion and predicts a fourth murder to complete a
complex geographical, mystical and numerological scheme: what he
does not foresee, fatally, is that the murder will be his own.'4 The
Robbe-Grillet nouveau roman is longer and less lucid, involving the
play of surfaces and distortions of time and space. But within that
surrealistic texture the plot, reminiscent of the Oedipus, concerns a
detective who is sent to investigate a shooting. He is misinformed that
the assassin's target is dead; twenty-four hours later the victim is
indeed shot dead, but it is the detective who has become his accidental
assassin.
Diirrenmatt's version is less slick and more pathetic. In The
Pledge the super-detective, Inspector Matthai, though about to leave
the country on an overseas assignment that was to have been the
climax of his career, begins investigating a set of gruesome sexmurders of children. In a moment of genuine passion, he swears to the
mother of the latest victim that he will not rest until he has brought the
monster to justice. Obsessed with his pledge Matthai sacrifices fame
and success to stay on the case: he sets a trap for the killer using
another little girl as the bait. But Matthai waits and waits and the killer
does not appear. Years pass, Matthai himself goes to seed, the little
girl grows into a warped and unhappy adolescent. The ending
bespeaks hideous waste of life and energy-but what has gone wrong?
Were Matthars deductions mistaken? Not till long after both detective and girl have in effect been destroyed by Matthars zeal is the truth
revealed: that Matthai had been a perfect detective, had been correct
in every detail,. but that the killer's rendezvous with justice was
prevented by that most banal of chance events, a fatal auto accident.
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol10/iss2/5
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In Robbe-Grillet, the detective's semiotic investigations lead
him to an inadvertent murder; in Borges, to a triumph that is his own
destruction; in Diirrenmatt, to a dead end. The denouement of The
Name of the Rose partakes of all three topoi of the antimystery.
First of all, William and Adso had been called in to investigate a
case of sudden death at the nameless abbey where the story is set for
what might be called political reasons. The Benedictine order is
hoping to stay neutral and more or less independent of the struggles
between Pope and Emperor, Ghibelline and Guelf, and the abbot
fears that the disorder of an unexplained homicide will put the abbey
into the power of the Pope's inquisition. But the effect of the investigation is to stir up suspicions that lead to further homicides, and to the
false and irrelevant but politically damaging arrest of two monks for
heresy and witchcraft by the papal inquisitor.
This is only a foreshadowing of the eventual solution of the
crimes, which leads to the effective destruction of the abbey as a
whole. This ending, as dramatically gripping as it is philosophically
fascinating, involves the final confrontation of William, the apostle of
positivism and enlightened rationality, with the blind sage Jorge of
Burgos, who like Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor seeks to enslave his
fellow-creatures' minds in order to rescue them from too much
knowledge and freedom. While the Abbot himself suffocates in a
coffin-like passage below them, the confrontation takes place in the
finis Africae, the secret room in the monastic library where Jorge has
hidden the Aristotelian treatise on comedy that symbolizes his terror
of knowledge. There Jorge proudly admits that he poisoned the book's
pages to keep its contents forever from spreading, thereby entailing
the deaths of two monks who insisted upon reading it. But to the bookloving reader, the horror of this confession pales before what follows:
in the course of the struggle and the darkling pursuit through the
midnight library subsequent to Jorge's confession, Adso's oil lamp is
dashed from his hands, lands on a dry pile of parchment, and "as if for
centuries those ancient pages had been yearning for arson and were
rejoicing in the sudden satisfaction of an immemorial thirst for
ecpyrosis," the Aristotle manuscript and with it the entire library, the
wonder of Europe, burns to the ground. Jorge is dead, and in a
technical sense justice has been done, but William's is a pyrrhic
victory in which no one could take any satisfaction.
But the principal victim of the denouement is neither the Abbot
nor the library itself, but the hermeneutic process of detection that
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underlies the novel and its entire genre. As William himself is honest
enough to admit to Adso, amid the burning carnage of the library, he
discovered Jorge's guilt via a train of reasoning that was in fact
completely mistaken. While there were many clues that William read
rightly, the trail that led him most directly to Jorge was an intertextual
pattern-the connection that seems to be woven between the
successive deaths in the abbey and the prophecy of the seven angels
with the seven trumpets in the book of Revelation (8:6 to 10:10).
The first death, that of Adelmo the illustrator, who is found fallen
from a high window into a bloody patch of snow, resembles the first
angel whose trumpet brings "hail and fire mingled with blood"
(p. 159). The next day Venantius is found drowned in a tub of blood,
recalling the prophecy of the second angel, at the sound of whose
trumpet "the third part of the sea became blood." And similarly
through the three mysterious deaths that follow: the third angel
poisons "a third of the rivers" and Berengar is found poisoned in the
balneary; with the fourth trumpet "a third of the sun was struck and a
third of the moon, and a third of the stars" and Severinus is found with
his head bashed in by an armillary sphere portraying the sun, moon
and stars; the fifth trumpet brings locusts with "power like the power
of scorpions of the earth," and on the fifth day Malachi falls dying of
poison, with the mysterious last words "he told me
truly
it had
the power of a thousand scorpions.
."
Eco's use of the seven angels of the apocalypse is itself
intertextual. This literary pattern recalls many classic detective
stories: including S. S. Van Dine's The Benson Murder Case, where
a series of murders is based on nursery rhymes; Agatha Christie's The
ABC Murders, with an alphabetical pattern; Ellery Queen's Ten
Days Wonder, where the crimes follow the Ten Commandments. In
classic mysteries, the pattern is a red herring: it is a way of concealing
another, more significant pattern. This is what Borges parodies in
"Death and the Compass," where Lonnrot the detective sees through
a specious numerological pattern of threes to a genuine pattern of
fours-and so keeps the appointment in Samarrah with his own
murderer.
In The Name ofthe Rose, it is the connection of the deaths with
the book of Apocalypse and with Jorge's violently apocalyptic
sermon that leads William to link the Spanish monk and the murders.
To a reader familiar with the topoi of detection, it seems quite
reasonable: Jorge is, as a blind man, the "least likely person" to have
.

.

.

.

.

.
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committed the crimes, and therefore, by the conventions of mystery,
an excellent candidate. Furthermore, Jorge is one of very few monks
with the temperament to have committed a ruthless series of crimes,
and the only one made on sufficiently grand an intellectual scale to be
a worthy foe to William-no one else could play Moriarty to his
Holmes.
The penultimate revelation, of course, is that William's
reasoning is based on paralogism. If the murders are a connected and
concerted plot, then Jorge must be behind it. But as William admits to
an astonished Adso, "There was no plot
and I discovered it by
mistake" (p. 491). Jorge poisoned the Poetics of Comedy, right
enough, but the apparent connections among the deaths-and of the
deaths to the prophecy-were meaningless coincidences:
.

.

.

"I arrived at Jorge through an apocalyptic pattern that seemed to
underlie all the crimes, and yet it was accidental. I arrived at
Jorge seeking one criminal for all the crimes and we discovered
that each crime was committed by a different person, or by no
one. I arrived at Jorge pursuing the plan of a perverse and rational
mind, and there was no plan, or rather Jorge himself was
overcome by his own initial design and there began a sequence of
causes, and concauses, and of causes contradicting one another,
which proceeded on their own, creating relations that did not
stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom, then? I behaved
stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have
known well that there is no order in the universe." (p. 492)
Like Matthai in The Pledge, William has been cheated by chance, and
though evil is not finally triumphant, the semiotic rationale of literary
detection is decisively defeated.
What I hesitatingly would call the ultimate revelation is
something that occurred to me after I had completed the novel-and
while one perhaps might grasp it as it happens it is not marked or noted
within the text. I am referring to the fact that the phony apocalyptic
pattern William follows on the trail of Jorge continues unbroken right
to the end. The sixth victim, the abbot, suffocates, as we said, in a
sealed passageway-recalling the prophecy of the sixth angel and
death by suffocation, the monstrous horsemen who kill by "smoke
and sulphur" which "issue from their mouths." And the last death is
appropriately that of Jorge himself, who succeeds in killing himself
and foiling William's desire to read the lost manuscript by cramming
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the poisoned pages down his own throat. This recalls the last angel of
Revelation, who gives John a scroll and tells him "Take it and eat. .
And II. ate it; it was sweet as honey in my mouth, but when I had
eaten it my stomach was made bitter."
In a playful way, then, Eco rejects the semiotic faith that one may
accurately read the world through patterns, but continues
nevertheless to impose upon the story the patterns we are warned
against trusting. Has Eco rejected the play of signs or affirmed it? Is
this an anti-mystery-or an anti-anti-mystery? If I am correct, in the
ending of this astonishing novel the careful reader is set uneasily adrift
between the radical rationalism of the detective story and the radical
deconstruction of that rationalism. And the purpose of the
reverberation between these ways of reading might be to make us
conscious of the special kind of text this is and the way we must
decode it.
Here as elsewhere in The Name of the Rose one may detect an
enactment of Eco's earlier criticism, in this case the 1975-77 essay
"Lector in Fabula," first printed in The Role of the Reader. After an
analysis of the contradictory sign-structures and demands made on
the reader's inferential capacity within "Drame" (a metafiction by
.

.

.

.

Alphonse Allais), Eco concluded that
there are different types of fictional texts. Some ask for a
maximum of intrusion
and are called "open" works. Some
others are mealymouthed and, while pretending to elicit our
cooperation, in fact want us to think their way and are very
"closed" and repressive. "Drame" seems to stay half-way: it
lures the Model Reader into an excess of cooperation and then
punishes him for having overdone it. 15
.

.

.

Now what I have here called mystery and anti-mystery are, in effect,
what Eco has called "closed" and "open" texts. The Name of the
Rose is neither; like "Drame," it "is neither open nor closed: it
belongs to a third category of works, to an exclusive club whose
chairman is probably Tristram Shandy. These works tell stories
about the way stories are built up ." (p. 256). Like "Drame," The
Name ofthe Rose "asks us . to extrapolate from it the rules of the
textual discipline it suggests" (p. 256). Learning these rules has
always been what Eco's work has been about.
.

.

.

.
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NOTES

I. Alain is given his Latin cognomen, 4 /anus ad Mullis, in Umberto Eco, The Name
of the Rose, trans. William Weaver (New York: Harcourt Brace-Jovanovich, 1983),
p. 23. All future references within the text are to this edition.

We are given selections from Holmes's essay, "The Book of Life." which Watson
reads skeptically, unaware of its authorship, in .4 Study in Scarlet, chapter 2. Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle, .4 Study in Scarlet and The Sign ofthe Four(New York: Berkley
Books, 1975).
3. Peirce may be regarded as one of the founders of semiotics-which may account
for the interest taken in him by semioticians like Thomas Sebeok and Eco himself. In
his private life Peirce (like Doyle himself) was an accomplished amateur detective. See
Thomas A. Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok, "'You Know My Method': A
Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes," in Umberto Eco and
Thomas A. Sebeok, eds., The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 11-54.
4. Umberto Eco, "Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three Types of
Abduction," in The Sign of Three, p. 206.
5. Name, pp. 304-5. A minor emendation to the translation is placed in brackets.
6. Frangois Arouet de Voltaire, Zadig, or Fate, trans. Tobias Smollett, in Candide
and Other Tales (London: Dent, 1937), p. 11.
7. One of the readers of this essay adds that Wittgenstein's "ladder image comes
from a philosopher of language, Fritz Mauthner, who is famous for his 'gottlose
Mystik'-the mystery of what sustains the world of speaking and of how words 'fit' their
referents. This reference-within-reference is, of course, one of Eco's techniques
elsewhere."
8.
Umberto Eco, "The Myth of Superman," in The Role of the Reader
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979). pp. 117-20.
9. Barbara Tuchman4 Distant Mirror (New York: Knopf, 1978), p. xviii.
10. To say that the political theme detracts formally from The Name ofthe Rose is not
to say that I would wish it away. Quite the contrary: as a textural element it is very
largely responsible for the novel's success-especially on a second reading when
mysteries so often fail to hold the reader's attention. I mean only that the theme functions neither to advance nor retard the conclusion-it neither makes the solution of the
mystery clearer nor distracts us with red herrings-and is therefore structurally
independent of the central mystery around which the novel is composed.
11. In The Pursuit of Crime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 37.
2.
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12. Msgr. Ronald Knox published a "Detective Story Decalogue" and S. S. Van
Dine a set of "Twenty Rules" for writing whodunits, both in 1928. They are reprinted
in Howard Haycraft, ed., The Art ofthe Mystery Story (New York: Carroll and Graf,
1983), pp. 189-96.
13. "The Detective Novel as Game," from Le Roman Policier (Buenos Aires: Sur,
1941), reprinted in Glenn W. Most and William W. Stowe, eds., The Poetics of
Murder (New York: Harcourt Brace-Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 1-12.
14. Eco has included a rich pattern of allusions to Borges within The Name of the
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